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Abstract
In times of the COVID-19 pandemic, difficult decisions such as the distribution of ventilators must be made. For many of these decisions, humans could team up with algorithms;
however, people often prefer human decision-makers. We examined the role of situational
(morality of the scenario; perspective) and individual factors (need for leadership; conventionalism) for algorithm preference in a preregistered online experiment with German
adults (n = 1,127). As expected, algorithm preference was lowest in the most moral-laden
scenario. The effect of perspective (i.e., decision-makers vs. decision targets) was only significant in the most moral scenario. Need for leadership predicted a stronger algorithm
preference, whereas conventionalism was related to weaker algorithm preference. Exploratory analyses revealed that attitudes and knowledge also mattered, stressing the importance of individual factors.
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During the pandemic, many decisions with far-reaching consequences had to be made:
Governments had to decide on which restrictions to impose on the population (e.g., closing
schools, imposing curfews) and when to loosen them (Gollwitzer et al., 2020); physicians
had to decide who gets a potentially life-saving ventilator in overwhelmed hospitals, and
civil servants at ministries had to decide which businesses receive financial support after
being forced to close for months.
Algorithms could have helped in making these and related decisions. Algorithms process “(big) data captured through digitized devices” and use past behavior to predict future
events (Newell & Marabelli, 2015, p. 4). Algorithms might be especially helpful in situations
like the pandemic in which human deciders lack experience. However, prior research has
shown that people are often algorithm averse (Castelo et al., 2019; Dietvorst et al., 2015).
For policymakers, it is thus important to know under which circumstances algorithmic
decision-making and, more specifically, different combinations of human-algorithm teaming would be accepted. Two groups are important in this context: (1) the decision-makers
who could now (also) rely on algorithmic input and (2) the decision targets whose outcomes depend on the decisions made. The question of human-machine teaming has been
addressed in the field of human-machine communication, but usually from the perspective
of the decision-maker and with a focus on more agentic and anthropomorphic virtual teammates such as robots (Calhoun et al., 2019; Matthews et al., 2020). Work on algorithm acceptance has addressed both perspectives, albeit usually not in the same study; we thus build on
work on algorithm acceptance to identify relevant situational and individual influence factors and develop a new measure that goes beyond a dichotomous human versus algorithm
choice, which enables assessment of the preference for different human-algorithm teaming
combinations. This approach promotes ecological validity because algorithms rarely make
decisions on their own but usually function as advisors or recommenders.
Specifically, we examined morality of the decision scenario and the perspective as situational factors and both conventionalism and need for leadership as individual factors. Previous work has found that people are more averse to algorithms when moral decisions must be
made (Bigman & Gray, 2018; Castelo et al., 2019). We aim to extend this work by examining
whether it matters from which perspective the algorithmic decision-making is judged: Do
people show a higher preference for algorithms if they take the decision-maker’s perspective
compared to the perspective of the target of the decision? A physician, for example, might
perceive the algorithm as an “advanced tool” (Matthews et al., 2020, p. 234), whereas patients
might perceive it as a threat and prefer a human deciding upon their life.
Most prior work on algorithm aversion looked at characteristics of the algorithm or the
human counterpart, but less on characteristics of the individuals choosing between algorithmic and human decision-making (Jussupow et al., 2020). In this paper, we look at conventionalism—an individual characteristic that should favor human decision-making—and an
individual’s need for leadership. Need for leadership might be especially relevant in times
of COVID-19 because this need is stronger in times of crisis (Mulder & Stemerding, 1963).

Algorithm Aversion and Appreciation
The term algorithm aversion has been coined by Dietvorst et al. (2015) to describe the
sometimes not rational reaction of users toward algorithms, such as a preference for human
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decision-making even if the algorithmic decisions are superior to the ones made by humans.
Research on algorithm aversion has yielded inconsistent results, documenting also cases in
which individuals prefer algorithms to humans (algorithm appreciation, e.g., Dietvorst et
al., 2016; Logg et al., 2019).
Jussupow et al. (2020) reviewed experimental work in this field to identify characteristics of the algorithm versus a human decision-maker that predict whether algorithm
aversion or appreciation occurs. Frequently studied characteristics of the algorithms
are their agency or performance, and frequently studied characteristics of the human
decision-maker are their involvement in the development or training of the algorithm or
their expertise. Algorithmic agency led to aversion; thereby people were especially averse
to algorithms making decisions independently (Jussupow et al., 2020). Moreover, algorithm
aversion was lower when people perceived the algorithms as performing well and possessing human capabilities, whereas higher expertise of the human agent increased algorithm
aversion. Human involvement only had an indirect effect via algorithm agency and capabilities (Jussupow et al., 2020).

Human-Algorithm-Teaming
Algorithms rarely make decisions on their own; the topic of various forms and degrees
of human-algorithm teaming has therefore received attention. Starke and Lünich (2020)
showed that pure algorithmic decisions of the European Union would be perceived as illegitimate, whereas hybrid decisions are perceived as equally legitimate as human-only decisions. The authors did, however, not specify the nature of the human-algorithm teaming.
There is some conceptual work on this topic. Madni and Madni (2018) provide a framework that distinguishes the roles of humans and machines; frequent roles are the human
as supervisor and the machine either in an active or passive monitoring role. Van der Waa
et al. (2020) focus on moral decisions and distinguish between human moral decisionmaking, supported moral decision-making, co-active moral decision-making, and autonomous moral decision-making, in which the artificial moral agent makes moral decisions
on its own. These conceptual papers give examples of the different configurations and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the different patterns, but they do not examine
which factors determine the preference for lower or higher algorithmic input. In the paper
at hand, we fill this gap and use the COVID-19 pandemic as a setting to explore the role of
situational and individual factors.

Situational Factors
Morality/Severity of the Decision
The first factor we considered was the moral dimension of the decision task. According
to Schein and Gray (2018), the judgment of whether a situation is morally laden depends
on whether there is harm involved and how severe the consequences are. Although
there are representative surveys showing that people are less likely to accept algorithmic
decision-making in situations with severe consequences for humans such as parole, medical diagnoses and decisions, or personal finance scores (Grzymek & Puntschuh, 2019;
Longoni et al., 2019; Smith, 2018), there is surprisingly little experimental research on this
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topic. Bigman and Gray (2018) concluded that people display algorithm aversion when the
algorithms make moral decisions such as deciding over parole, or medical decisions. This
conclusion might imply a comparison with less moral-laden decisions; however, the nine
studies reported in the paper all used moral decision-making situations. In a similar vein,
Longoni et al. used only scenarios involving medical decision-making.
In contrast, in one of the few papers that showed high algorithm acceptance across several studies most decisions were objective judgment tasks (such as the weight of a person)
or had mild consequences (i.e., suggesting a dating partner; Logg et al., 2019). Castelo et
al. (2019) compared subjective and objective decision-making tasks and found that people
preferred algorithms for objective tasks. These objective tasks are less moral-laden. Taken
together, prior findings warrant the expectation that people are less algorithm averse if decisions involve less morality. This was, however, not directly tested in any of the studies.
Work on human-machine teaming has, to our knowledge, not systematically compared
scenarios varying in morality, but it assumes that it will take some time until artificial moral
agents reach human or even super-human levels of moral decision-making; consequentially, human-machine teaming is needed (van der Waa et al., 2020). This work, thus, also
implicitly assumes that people prefer less algorithmic involvement in moral decisions.
To systematically explore the role of morality, the work at hand varies the severity and
thus morality of the decision’s consequences across three scenarios: (1) a scenario about the
distribution of ventilators among patients, (2) a scenario about financial support for businesses suffering economically from the COVID-19 pandemic, and (3) a scenario on curfew
rules for members of risk groups. Since the ventilator scenario is about life and death, it
was considered the most morality-laden scenario with the most severe consequences and
should thus be met with the lowest preference for algorithms. We had no prediction about
the order of the other two scenarios.
H1: Preference for algorithmic decision-making is lowest in the ventilator scenario (highest morality and severity).
Perspective
We assumed that it matters whether a person is the target of a decision or the decisionmaker. An alternative explanation for the algorithm appreciation found in the studies
reported by Logg et al. (2019) is that the authors used the advice-taking paradigm; participants had to make decisions and received advice stemming allegedly from an algorithm
versus a human. In such a scenario, the algorithm might help the human make better decisions. Decision-makers might thus activate an “advanced tool” or even a “teammate” mental model (Matthews et al., 2020, p. 234) and be willing to share the responsibility for a
decision with an algorithm. Targets of a decision, by contrast, might view the algorithm as
a threat and be more interested in self-benefit than in the most accurate or efficiently made
decision. Self-serving biases have been shown in the domain of preference of fairness rules
(Messick & Sentis, 1983) and have been reported as “outcome favorability bias” in studies
on algorithm acceptance (Wang et al., 2020, p. 1). In the context of COVID-19, elderly people with several diseases might, for example, be afraid that the “objectively” best decision is
to give the ventilator to a younger person with a higher chance of surviving a COVID-19
infection. In their mental model, the algorithm might form a threat to their life. They might,
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however, hope to be able to influence a human decision-maker, for example, by appealing
to empathy or by bribery. Therefore, we expect a higher preference for algorithms among
decision-makers relative to targets of decisions.
H2: Preference for algorithmic decision-making is higher in the decision-maker
(versus target of decision) condition.
Next to these situational factors, there might be inter-individual differences that predict
the preference for algorithmic versus human decision-making.

Individual Factors
Conventionalism
Algorithms and artificial intelligence are quite new phenomena. To a layperson, it is often
not clear how algorithms make complex decisions (Grzymek & Puntschuh, 2019). GrgicHlaca et al. (2018) found that conservatism affected the perceived fairness of algorithms.
Similarly, we expected that people scoring high on conventionalism, that is, people who
prefer to stick to established procedures and norms, are more averse toward these new
and non-transparent technologies and hence show a weaker preference for algorithmic
decision-making.
H3: People higher in conventionalism show a weaker preference for algorithmic
decision-making.
Need for Leadership
A personality factor that might be relevant in times of crisis is the need for leadership.
Crises are characterized by uncertainties; this holds especially for the novel coronavirus.
At the time this study was conducted, nobody knew when a treatment or a vaccine would
be found and how large the impact of the lockdowns on the economy or mental health of
people would be. In times of crisis, people show a stronger need for leadership (Mulder &
Stemerding, 1963). People expect leaders to make clear and consistent decisions, as could
be seen in the higher approval ratings of politicians who implemented tough measures in
response to COVID-19 (Erlanger, 2020). Based on this assumption, one should expect that
a higher need for leadership is related to a preference for human decision-making. However, it might also be the case that a higher need for leadership is related to a preference for
algorithmic decision-making because algorithms might be perceived as more objective (in
the sense of following the same rules all the time) and thus as giving clearer and more consistent guidance. It is also possible that need for leadership is related to higher endorsement
for decisions made by one entity alone (versus a team), no matter whether it is a human
or an algorithm. Since there are several possibilities, an open research question was posed:
RQ: Is need for leadership related to algorithm preference?
Attitudes Toward Algorithms and Knowledge
By way of exploration, the participants’ attitudes toward algorithms and knowledge about
algorithms were assessed. Concerning the attitudes, we covered the perceived decision
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quality (ability of algorithms to process large amounts of data/a wider variety of data types),
different aspects of fairness, and perceived manipulability to explore whether the effects of
the other variables remain robust when controlling for attitudes and knowledge. The focus
of the experiment is—as can also be seen in the preregistration—however, on the situational and individual factors.
The hypotheses and research questions, operationalization, design, and analysis plan
have been preregistered at https://aspredicted.org/zv2m2.pdf.1

Method
Participants
The study was approved by the local ethics committee of Leibniz-Institut für Wissensmedien
(Knowledge Media Research Center), Tübingen. All 14,283 members of the WiSoPanel, an
online access panel for non-commercial research (Göritz et al., 2021), were invited via email
to participate. The experiment had a 3 (scenario: ventilator, financial support, curfew) × 2
(perspective: target of the decision versus decision-maker) design. The scenario factor was a
within-subjects factor; the perspective factor was manipulated between subjects. Only people who permitted the use of their data at the end of the questionnaire (1,192 women, 968
men) were retained. Most of the participants were German (96.6%), 1.9% were Austrian,
1% Swiss, and 0.4% from other countries. The largest group of participants (31.7%) had a
university degree, 23.8% A-Levels, 29.5% O-Levels, 11.4% had finished 9 years of school,
0.6% had no degree (yet), and 3.1% had a doctorate. The majority (61.1%) were working,
20.4% were retired, 8.1% pupils/students, 5.7% unemployed, and 1% on parental leave.

Procedure
After reading the introduction and providing informed consent, respondents stated their
preferences for algorithmic versus human decision-making in three COVID19-related
decision scenarios. Depending on the experimental condition, participants either took the
perspective of the target of the decision or of the decision-maker in all three scenarios.

Independent Variables
Scenarios
In the first scenario, participants were asked to imagine that there were more COVID-19
patients than ventilators, hence a decision about who gets a ventilator had to be made.
In the second scenario, a decision about whether financial support should be granted to
business owners who suffered financially from the COVID-19-induced closure of their
business had to be made. In the last scenario, participants were told that the local public
health departments would decide for individual members of risk groups whether they had
to adhere to stronger curfew rules.

Utz, Wolfers, and Göritz

33

Perspective
In the target of the decision condition, participants were asked to imagine that they were a
COVID-19 patient, a business owner, or at higher risk to die from COVID-19, respectively
for the three scenarios. In the decision-maker condition, participants were asked to imagine that they were a physician, a clerk, or an employee of the public health department,
respectively.

Measures
Algorithm Preference
Since hitherto used measures are not equally applicable to decision-makers and decision
targets and because we aimed to go beyond a dichotomous choice between human versus algorithm, we offered six combinations of human-algorithm teaming (see Table 1, top
row) and gave people fine-grained options to indicate their preferences. Participants were
instructed to distribute 100 points across the decision-making options. They could either
assign 100 points to their favorite option or split the points across options. For the first three
options, the algorithm made the final decision; for the last three options, a human made
the final decision. In the two most extreme cases, the decision was made by the algorithm/
human alone. In the next option, in difficult cases, a human/an algorithm made a suggestion that could be incorporated by the algorithm/human; in the two options in the middle,
the algorithm/human considered the suggestion of the human/algorithm in all decisions.
TABLE 1 Mean Number of Points Given to the Six Decision Options Across Scenarios
and Perspective (Subsample With Correct Manipulation Checks)

Ventilator

decision target

Human,
input from
algorithm
Human in difficult
cases
alone
(2)
(1)
21.42
25.75

Human but
always
input from
algorithm
(3)
28.44

Algorithm,
Algorithm input from
but always human in
input from difficult Algorithm
alone
cases
human
(6)
(5)
(4)
12.07
6.37
5.96

decision-maker 12.57

24.21

34.20

13.08

7.42

8.53

Financial

decision target

12.24

19.36

32.12

16.57

11.35

8.37

Support

decision-maker 11.10

19.55

32.92

16.99

10.06

9.38

16.34

19.44

29.10

14.79

9.89

10.44

decision-maker 14.38

22.26

29.76

15.08

9.20

9.32

Curfew

decision target

Note: Sums not adding up exactly to 100 within some rows due to rounding.

Need for Leadership
We adapted five items from the interpersonal hierarchy expectation scale by Mast (2005)
to the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., “If people work together on a task like the
current corona crisis, it’s best if one person is taking over the lead.”). Respondents indicated
their agreement with the statements on a scale ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 =
“strongly agree” (α = .80, M = 4.48, SD = 1.26).
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Conventionalism
Conventionalism was measured with the 3-item scale by Beierlein et al. (2014). Agreement
to statements like “It is always best to do things the usual way” was provided on a 7-point
Likert scale (α = .83, M = 3.65, SD = 1.56).
Attitude Toward Algorithms
To measure attitude toward algorithms, 10 items were developed that covered various
aspects of decision-making. Participants indicated whether they thought humans or algorithms would usually perform better on a certain aspect on a scale from 1 = “humans” to
3 = “humans and algorithms to the same degree” to 5 = “algorithms.” A confirmatory factor
analysis allowing for correlations between factors showed that, as expected, the 10 items
loaded on five factors (χ2[25, N = 2147] = 218.20, p < .001; CFI = 0.94; RMSEA = .060), correctness of decision (M = 3.21, SD = 0.75), procedural fairness (e.g., judge situations always
along the same factors, M = 3.98, SD = 0.92), multifactorial decision-making (M = 3.17, SD
= 1.01), manipulability (M = 2.33, SD = 1.00), and general fairness (M = 3.13, SD = 0.87).
For items and more results see https://osf.io/cx6z8/.
Knowledge About Algorithms
As a control variable, participants were asked to indicate their knowledge about algorithms
(definition, methods, accuracy, fairness) on a scale from 1 = very poor knowledge to 7 =
very good knowledge (M = 4.08, SD = 1.53).
Manipulation Checks
Participants were asked whether they had been in the role of the patient or physician in
Scenario 1, business owner or clerk in Scenario 2, a member of the group at higher risk of
the coronavirus or employee at the public health department in Scenario 3. There was also a
“don’t know” option to reduce guessing. Participants were also asked to rank order the three
scenarios in terms of severity and moral dimension by dragging and dropping them to the
top, middle, or bottom position.
COVID-19-Related Additional Measures
Participants were asked for their subjective risk to get infected with COVID-19, whether
they were at higher risk from coronavirus according to the criteria issued by the national
Robert Koch institute (e.g., smoking, chronic medical condition), whether they had been
infected with COVID-19, or whether close others had been infected or died. The likelihood of experiencing negative financial consequences due to the COVID-19 pandemic was
assessed on a scale from 1 = “very unlikely” to 6 = “certainly.” Of the final sample (see below),
only 10 had been infected with COVID-19, 5.6% reported one or more infected close others. Roughly a quarter considered it likely, very likely, or certain to become infected, and
44.7% were members of a risk group.
Demographics
The following demographics were retrieved from the panel data: year of birth, gender, country, education, and employment status. The intercorrelations between the central measures
are displayed in Table 2.

-.14***
-.07*

-.03

-.08**
-.04
-.12***

-.07*

1126 .02

1127

-.06*
-.07*

.10*** -.07*

1127 .00
1127 -.02

1127

1122 .00
1127 -.01

-.02

-.21***

.04
.11***

.03

.02

.04

.12***

-.08**

.03

1126

-.07*
-.02

-.06

-.03

.38***

.01

1

.36***

.36***

.01

-.02

-.05

.01

.25***
.33***
-.32***
.45***

.20***

.17***

.22***

.01

.21***
-.16***
.31***

Intercorrelations
5
6
7

-.05
-.02
-.07*
-.09** -.01
-.06
-.01
-.02
.10**
-.07* -.07*

TABLE 2
4

.04
-.11***

3

1124 -.01

2
.27***
.08**
-.02

1

-.02
.04
-.04
.01

1127
1127
1127
1015
1123

n

.21***

.24***

.21***

.03

-.14***
.27***

8

.02
.32***

10

-.15***

.31***

-.16*** .32***

-.23***
.11***
-.17***

9

.07*

.04

.05

11

.59***

.51***

13

.51***

-

12

Note. P = Perspective, A = Attitude, DM = Decision–making, Pr = Algorithm preference. Higher values indicate a more positive attitude toward algorithms.
2
Higher values indicate a more negative attitude toward algorithms. 3Higher values indicate a stronger preference for algorithmic decision-making;
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

2 Conventionalism
3 Need for leadership
4 Risk: health
5 Risk: finance
6 A: correctness1
7 A: proc. fairness1
8 A: multifact. DM1
9 A: manipulability2
10 A: gen. fairness1
11 Knowledge
12 Pr: Ventilator3
13 Pr: Finance3
14 Pr: Curfew3

1 P: Decision-maker

Variables
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Data Preparation
Missings. Two participants were excluded because they had more than 30% missing values.
Construction of the dependent measure. As preregistered, we first inspected the distributions. To assess nuanced preferences, participants had the option to split 100 points across
six options rather than choosing only one option. The majority (56 to 60%, depending on
the scenario) did not split but gave 100% to their favorite option. Most people who split
their 100 points chose adjacent options (see Table 1 for descriptives). Therefore, we scored
the options from 1 (human alone) to 6 (algorithm alone) and multiplied them with the
points given, resulting in a scale from 100 to 600. Higher values represent a higher preference for algorithmic decision-making. A person giving 60 points to Option 3 (human
decides, but always with input from the algorithm), and 40 points to Option 4 (algorithm
decides, but always with input from the human), for example, has a score of 340 (3 * 60 + 4 *
40 = 340). A person favoring Option 3 with 60 points but leaning toward Option 2 (human
decides, input from algorithm only in difficult cases) with 40 points has a score of 260 (2
* 40 + 3 * 60 = 260). This scale thus provides more fine-grained information than simply
choosing one option.

Results
Manipulation Checks
As intended, the majority (91.7%) perceived the ventilator scenario as the decision involving most morality. It was also perceived as the most severe scenario by 87.3%. The other
two scenarios did not differ as clearly from each other; the curfew scenario was perceived
as the second-highest moral-laden (52%) and least severe (61.5%) scenario by most. The
financial support scenario was perceived as involving the least morality (55.1%) and as the
second-most severe scenario (58.8%). Since our hypothesis addressed the difference
between the first and the other two scenarios, we considered the manipulation of the within-subjects variable as successful.
The manipulation check for perspective was answered correctly by 69.2% of the respondents for Scenario 1, by 64.9% for Scenario 2, and by 68% for Scenario 3. Respondents
more often gave a wrong answer (between 20% and 33%, depending on the scenario) than
choosing the “don’t know” option. Interestingly, respondents in the decision-maker condition recalled the condition they were in better than respondents in the target condition
(75.3% vs. 63.3% in Scenario 1, 74.6% vs. 55.3% in Scenario 2, 72.8% vs. 63.3% in Scenario
3, all χ²s > 22.13, p < .001). As preregistered, people who failed the manipulation check
were excluded from the analysis; 1,127 participants were retained in the analysis (457 in the
target condition, 670 in the decision-maker condition).

Descriptive Results
Before turning to the effects of the situational and individual variables, we briefly report
the descriptive results. Table 1 shows that respondents overall leaned toward human
decision-making. A closer look reveals, however, that algorithmic input is welcome; specifically, algorithmic input in all situations is favored over algorithmic input in difficult
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situations only. This suggests that participants want a human to make the final decision, but
this human should team up with the algorithm.

Effects of Scenario and Perspective
A 2 (perspective: decision target versus decision-maker) × 3 (Scenarios 1 to 3) repeated
measures analysis of variance with repeated measures on the second factor and algorithm
preference as dependent variable was conducted to test H1 and H2. In line with H1, there
was a significant main effect of scenario, Huynh-Feldt corrected F(1.994, 2243.36) = 40.48,
p < .001, ηp2 = .04. Preference for algorithms was lowest in the ventilator scenario (M =
286.46, SE = 3.75, Bonferroni-corrected comparisons with both other scenarios p < .001).
The curfew scenario (M = 311.18, SE = 4.13) and the financial support scenario (M =
318.80, SE = 3.84) did not differ significantly, p = .11. In contrast to H2, the main effect of
perspective was not significant, F < 1, p = .34. There was, however, an interaction between
perspective and scenario, Huynh-Feldt corrected F(1.994, 2243.36) = 9.79, p < .001, ηp2 =
.01. In the ventilator scenario, algorithm preference was higher in the decision-maker condition (M = 299.02, SE = 4.77) than in the target condition (M = 273.90, SE = 5.78, p = .001).
In the financial support scenario, the means were almost identical (M = 318.79, SE = 5.92
in the target condition, M = 318.80, SE = 4.89 in the decision-maker condition, p = .999).
In the curfew scenario, the mean in the target condition was somewhat higher (M = 314.34,
SE = 6.37) than in the decision-maker condition (M = 308.03, SE = 5.26), but this difference
was not significant, p = .444. H2 is thus partly supported, namely in the ventilator scenario.

Influence of Individual Characteristics
To examine the role of individual characteristics, we conducted a multilevel analysis, treating scenario as nested within participants.2 We included a random intercept for participants.
In Step 1, we examined the effect of conventionalism (H3) and need for leadership (RQ)
in addition to the effects of perspective, scenario, and the interaction effects. We controlled
for being a member of a COVID-19 risk group and the risk to suffer from financial losses.
In Step 2, we exploringly added the attitude subscales and knowledge about algorithms.
Predictors were grand mean centered (see Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Standardized regression
coefficients are reported as effect size measures in Table 3 (see Lorah, 2018).
Table 3, Model 1, on the following page, shows the findings to be in line with H3: There
was a negative relationship between conventionalism and algorithm preference. The answer
to RQ1 is that need for leadership is positively related to a higher preference for algorithms.

Exploratory Analyses
In Model 2, we explored how the attitude toward algorithms affected algorithm preference. Several attitudes emerged as significant predictors: Algorithms were preferred more
if they were evaluated as making more correct decisions, being fairer (in general and
procedure-wise), and as integrating more aspects into their decision. Perceived knowledge
about algorithms was significantly associated with preferring an algorithm, but effects were
smaller than the effects of attitudes. Whereas the effects of scenario and the interaction with
perspective still held, the effects of conventionalism and need for leadership were no longer
significant when adding attitudes and knowledge to the model.

38

Human-Machine Communication

TABLE 3 Multilevel Regression Analysis on Preference for Algorithmic Decision-Making
Fixed effects

Parameters
Model 1
Intercept
P: Decision-maker cond.
Sc: Ventilator cond.
Sc: Financial support cond.
Need for leadership
Conventionalism
Risk: health
Risk: financial
Perspective × Ventilator
Perspective × Financial
Model 2
Intercept
P: Decision-maker cond.
Sc: Ventilator cond.
Sc: Financial support cond.
Need for leadership
Conventionalism
Risk: health
Risk: financial
Perspective × Ventilator
Perspective × Financial
A: correctness
A: procedural fairness
A: multifactorial DM
A: manipulability
A: general fairness
Knowledge
χ2
p
R2 (marginal/conditional)

Estimate

Random
effects

SE

t

β

SD

307.39
7.48
-22.19
8.62
10.12
-7.21
-11.87
-0.01
29.39
6.45

3.36
6.87
3.87
3.87
2.81
2.34
6.78
2.29
7.89
7.89

91.61
1.09
-5.74*
2.23*
3.61*
-3.07*
-1.75
-0.00
3.72*
0.82

.01
.03
-.08
.03
.10
-.08
-.05
-.00
.05
.01

93.91

306.56
8.94
-22.19
8.62
2.92
-0.24
-5.65
2.67
29.39
6.45
42.58
11.25
10.37
-3.44
23.31
4.22
289.11
<.001
.20/.55

2.92
5.97
3.87
3.87
2.48
2.11
5.92
2.00
7.89
7.89
4.69
3.90
3.07
3.20
3.97
1.95

105.11
1.50
-5.74*
2.23*
1.17
-0.12
-0.95
1.33
3.72*
0.82
9.08*
2.88*
3.38*
-1.08
5.87*
2.17*

.00
.03
-.08
.03
.02
-.00
-.02
.03
.05
.01
.24
.07
.08
-.02
.15
.05

77.73

Note. 3,018 observations on 1,006 individuals. Higher values indicate a preference for an algorithm; P =
Perspective; Sc = Scenario; A = Attitude; DM = decision-making; Predictors are grand mean centered; All
factors were coded using contrast coding (Gelman & Hill, 2007). * |t| > 2.0, indicating a significant effect.
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Discussion
The goal of this work was to examine the preference for different forms of human-algorithm
teaming in algorithmic decision-making, exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic to create
three salient and realistic scenarios. We examined the effects of situational (morality, perspective) and individual characteristics (conventionalism, need for leadership). In addition,
the roles of attitudes toward algorithms and knowledge were explored. We found that the
morality of a decision mattered: Participants showed the lowest preference for algorithmic
decision-making in the ventilator scenario. Moreover, in this scenario decision targets were
more reluctant to let algorithms decide than decision-makers. Higher conventionalism was
associated with a lower preference for algorithmic decision-making, whereas a higher need
for leadership was associated with a higher preference for algorithmic decision-making.
Attitudes toward algorithms and knowledge contributed to predicting algorithm preference; thereby, decision quality and fairness were most important.

Contributions to Prior Work
Our results contribute to work on human-algorithm teaming by providing a measure that
assesses the preference for certain combinations of human-algorithm teaming. Different
patterns have been described before (Madni & Madni, 2018; van der Waa et al., 2020), and
it has been shown that people favor hybrid decision-making over pure algorithmic decision-making (Starke & Lünich, 2020), but less was known about preferences for the different forms of human-algorithm teaming. We showed that participants overall preferred
algorithmic advice in all decision situations to algorithmic advice only in difficult decision
cases.
Prior work rarely looked at situational and individual characteristics that predict these
preferences systematically. Another contribution of our work lies, thus, in varying the
morality of the scenarios and the perspective of the participant. Work that merely looked at
medical decision-making showed that algorithm preference is low in such scenarios (Bigman & Gray, 2018; Longoni et al., 2019). Our results demonstrate that algorithm preference
is lower in more moral-laden scenarios and that this effect is more pronounced when being
the target of the decision. Decision-makers were less influenced by the morality of the scenario.
In contrast to our prediction, perspective mattered only in the most moral scenario. We
did, thus, not find consistent evidence of an outcome favorability bias. Self-interest seems
to bias decisions only in situations with high stakes. This seems to be in contrast with prior
work, but in those studies, the outcomes were explicitly stated, and the dependent measure was perceived fairness, not the preference for algorithmic decision-making (Wang
et al., 2020). Future research, however, is needed to explicitly test the role of self-interest
and (expected) outcomes. The observation that perspective did not matter much also has
implications for the interpretation of prior work. It suggests that the algorithm appreciation
reported by Logg et al. (2019) may not be due to the decision-maker perspective but the
moral-free judgment tasks.
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This study also contributes to work on individual predictors of algorithm preference;
a topic that has been understudied compared to work on algorithm characteristics (Jussupow, 2020). We found the expected negative relationship between conventionalism and
algorithm preference. With need for leadership, we found a positive association with algorithm preference: People with a higher need for leadership are not necessarily more interested in a strong human leader, but in clear and consistent guidance, which might be more
easily achieved by an algorithm in times of crisis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the
German federal states employed different rules regarding school openings or curfews, and
this diversity in rules was evaluated negatively by most of the population (COSMO, 2021).
Our exploratory analyses showed that attitudes toward algorithms mattered. Interestingly, the preference for algorithmic decision-making was not influenced by the perceived
manipulability, although humans were perceived as easier to manipulate, which could be
a reason for decision targets to prefer humans. Instead, quality of decision-making and
perceived general fairness mattered most. Our participants considered algorithms as fairer
than humans; nevertheless, one should be aware that algorithmic decisions mirror existing
human biases such as prejudice or stereotypes and thus discriminate against certain groups
(Noble, 2018; Zafar et al., 2019). The quality of algorithms depends on the training data
used; if, for example, historic hiring data of a company that predominantly hired men are
used to train an algorithm, the algorithm is likely to discriminate against women (O’Neil,
2016). Furthermore, deeper knowledge about algorithms was positively related to algorithm
preference. Interestingly, knowledge was almost unrelated to attitudes but negatively associated with conventionalism. This shows again that conventionalism should be considered a
potential barrier when trying to increase the public’s algorithm acceptance.
After controlling for attitudes and knowledge, the effects of need for leadership and
conventionalism were no longer significant, although the effects of scenario and perspective remained. The former is, however, not surprising because high attitude-behavior intention relationships are found when the correspondence between the attitude items and the
behavior is high (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). It is often assumed that attitudes are informed by
knowledge; our data indicate that personality matters as well. Especially conventionalism
showed negative associations with knowledge and attitudes. The results thus hint at a potential underlying process: People higher in conventionalism might show a lower algorithm
preference because they are less willing to learn about algorithms (and other new things)
and have more negative attitudes.

Directions for Future Research
Our experiment provides a starting point for future research. First, future research should
look at underlying processes. When it comes to the decision targets, assumed outcome
favorability and self-interest (versus interest in the fairest decision) should be assessed. In
the decision-makers, looking at the mental models could be fruitful. Do decision-makers
perceive the algorithm as an advanced tool, a teammate (Matthews et al., 2020), or do they
even develop new mental models for human-algorithm teaming (Gambino et al., 2020)?
Second, work on human-algorithm teaming might focus more on the role of personality. The body of work has hitherto mainly looked at characteristics of the algorithmic
teammate (e.g., agency, perceived autonomy, transparency), but the preference for a certain

Utz, Wolfers, and Göritz

41

teaming-constellation might interact with individual characteristics. Considering both factors jointly would advance work on human-algorithm and more general human-machine
teaming.
Third, future research could explore whether the results are specific to scenarios with a
high salience and relevance like the COVID-19-related decisions we used during the pandemic.
Fourth, cross-cultural research could explore how far attitudes and the relationships
between attitudes and knowledge are due to the specific media coverage of algorithmic
decision-making in certain countries.

Practical Implications
The results have practical implications for policymaking. They show that the public is, in
general, open to advice from algorithms, but that people prefer a human making the final
decision. Since algorithms rarely make decisions completely on their own, governments
planning to use algorithmic decision-making should use those only as advice-givers and
communicate clearly that a human will make the final judgment.
Campaigns for increasing algorithm acceptance should especially target conventional
people and consider that this group overall knows less about algorithms. For less moral
decisions, it is important to know that decision-makers and targets did not differ in their
preference of human-algorithm teaming and can thus be targeted with the same campaign.
When it comes to moral decisions—as they occur frequently during a life-threatening
pandemic—it is important to especially address the potential targets of the decisions
because this group shows a lower preference for algorithmic input than decision-makers.

Limitations and Strengths
A limitation of the study is the relatively high number of failed manipulation checks. We,
however, still had more than 1,100 people for analysis and thus almost twice the preregistered sample size of n = 602 for 80% power. Another limitation is that we did not randomize
the order of the scenarios. Some may consider it a limitation that the scenarios varied in
the domain (e.g., health versus finance). However, this confound cannot be avoided because
decisions threatening a person’s life are inherently more moral than decisions involving
finance because they imply more harm (Schein & Gray, 2018). The same situation has been
faced by other authors; Reniers et al. (2012), for example, used robbing a bank to pay the
cancer medicine for one’s wife versus eating chips while one should lose weight as a moral
versus non-moral decision.
Furthermore, it is important to interpret our results considering the situation in Germany. Germany did a relatively good job in dealing with the pandemic at the time of data
collection. It is thus unclear to which extent the results can be generalized to countries with
an actual shortage of ventilators and a less tight-meshed social support system. The effects
might be stronger in a country more strongly affected by COVID-19. Likewise, mean levels
of need for leadership, conventionalism, and attitudes toward algorithms are likely to differ
among countries; especially because issues such as racial discrimination by algorithms are
less salient in Germany than, for example, the US (Noble, 2018).
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A strength of our study is the large and heterogeneous sample, covering a wide range
of age, education levels, and employment status. Moreover, the decision-making scenarios
were more realistic and salient than some of the advice-taking paradigms used in prior
research on algorithm aversion.
To conclude, this study showed that the morality of a decision is a situational factor
that determines the preference for different forms of algorithm-human teaming. The perspective decision target versus decision-maker mattered only in the most moral scenario.
Moreover, personality factors such as need for leadership and conventionalism should be
considered when studying attitudes toward algorithms and algorithm preference.
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Footnotes
1. We had two additional hypotheses and a research question on the role of individual
outcome expectations. We realized, however, that we had not completely thought
these through and not operationalized this variable in the best possible way. Based on
reviewer feedback on a prior version on this manuscript, we decided to not include the
weak theoretical justification and the results of these analyses. We adjusted the numbering of the hypotheses and research question. These analyses are, however, available
on https://osf.io/cx6z8/. We also provide a table listing and justifying deviations from
the preregistration on OSF.
2. In the preregistration, we had planned to do separate regression analyses per scenario. The main reason for this procedure was that the individual outcome expectations (see Footnote 1) were operationalized in different ways across the scenarios. Since
we dropped this variable, we opted for the more appropriate multilevel approach that
allows us to control for the nested data structure (scenarios nested within participants)
and presents the results in a more compact way. The basic pattern is identical.

